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IS COLLECTIVE MEMORY MAKING THE NEXT BALKAN WAR IMMINENT? 
 
By Nikola Knežević 
Nikola Knežević (PhD, Protestant Theological Seminary, Novi Sad, Serbia; MTh, Evangelical 
Theological Seminary, Osijek, Croatia) is the founder and former president of the Center for the 
Study of Religion, Politics, and Society in Serbia (http://culturechristianity.com/about/?lang=en), 
a member of The Institute for the Study of Culture and Christianity, and an author of several 
books and co-author of many conference proceedings and articles. Knežević directed two 
feature-length documentaries on memories, war, and religion in ex-Yugoslavia. He lives and 
works in Las Vegas. His major research interests include political theology, politics, and 
religion. (knezevic@religioandpolitics.us)    
 
Sometimes cultures, religions, and ethnicities that shared the same space for centuries 
become fierce rivals, forcing their irreconcilable differences to develop to such an extent that 
they see war as the only option. The Balkans has had its share of conflicts, destruction, and 
atrocities leaving scars too deep to heal. The question is: have they seen the end of it, or will the 
frozen conflict lurking beneath the fragile peace unleash its deadly force again? 
Whether due to the reluctance of local political leaders to leave the selective use of the 
past behind, the influence of Russian right-wing populism, the embrace of ethnic divisions as 
dominant rhetoric and policies, or the neglect of victims on the other side--with each day, the 
sum of all fears is that the new conflict is imminent and closing in fast. 
There was a time when I was more optimistic about the future of the western Balkans: 
while as professor and president of NGO, I was engaged in regional peacekeeping initiatives, 
particularly those involving dominant religions in the process of transitional justice. The results, 
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however, were not promising, leaving the entire effort trapped inside irreconcilable differences 
or superficial and dishonest statements of political or religious officials.  
The political climate is very unlikely to change for the better. Dysfunctional states and 
governments, economic distress, ethnic divisions, and corrupt political elites are leaving the 
population in discontent, distrust and strongly inclined towards right-wing agendas, or, at least, 
ones that have not already left the peninsula pursuing a better life with more security. The future 
seems very gloomy and filled with uncertainty for the ex-Yugoslav states. 
 
Brief History of the Conflicts 
The western Balkans is a complex equation with too many unknown variables, a ticking 
bomb that is ready to pop at any moment with the incomprehensible outcome. More than two 
decades have passed since the last armed conflict and yet, I have a strong sense that we are only 
getting further from the long-term political and economic stability so needed in ex-Yugoslavia. 
Hidden beneath the recently-born democracies that are still facing many issues, such as freedom 
of speech, human rights violations, and corruption, there is a problem far more sinister, a 
problem rooted deeply in the collective identities of ex-Yugoslav nations. Lingering political 
crisis and ethnic tensions between the former conflicting parties, the complex intertwining 
between dominant religions and politics, the meddling of foreign powers, and rising right-wing 
and religious fundamentalism are a few reasons why the Western Balkans should be among the 
priorities for U.S. foreign policy. 
The economic distress, corruption, and the lack of long-term political stability have 
caused much of the younger population to leave their homes, providing the perfect environment 
for the success of right-wing populism, so favored among members of the ruling political elite. 
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Populist rhetoric has generally become more common in Eastern Europe. Hungary, Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, and Poland are countries led by populist governments, regardless of their 
political compass, and the western Balkans is no exception. Only, there, such political 
romanticism, mingled with religious and right-wing extremism, proved to be a fatal combination, 
causing the bloodiest conflict since the Second World War. 
There are more than a few lingering conflicts in ex-Yugoslavia, and they all have a 
common denominator, an ethnic or religious subtext. The ongoing crisis between Serbia and 
Kosovo (former southern province of Serbia) is almost a century-long ethnic struggle between 
Serb and Albanian populations, which resulted in armed conflict in 1998 and  ethnic cleansing by 
Slobodan Milošević, the former Serbian president, who was charged later with war crimes. The 
war ended in 1999 with large-scale NATO air raids, led by the U.S. which lasted a few months 
and devastated the Serbian infrastructure and economy, and caused civilian casualties. Kosovo 
declared independence in 2008, but until this day, it remains a partially recognized state, 
struggling with corruption and crime, with a major dispute with Serbia and ethnic divisions 
between the north, populated by Serbs and the rest of the country with an Albanian majority. The 
Serbian Orthodox Church stands as a primary opposition to recognizing Kosovo independence 
opting for a frozen conflict. Serbs consider Kosovo as their Jerusalem, a "Holy Land," a specific 
focal point for Serbs as well as for the Serbian Orthodox Church, which still strongly inclines 
towards mythological narratives. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina lacks political stability and is a dead-locked political governance 
that is still divided by thick boundary lines between Bošnjak, Croatian, and Serbian ethnicities. 
In addition to political disputes between Republika Srpska (Serbian entity) and the Federation 
(Federation of Bosnian and Croatian entity), there is a serious problem of extreme interpretation 
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of Islam and Wahhabism, mainly influenced by Saudi Arabia, which tends to endanger the 
mainstream and milder form of Islam, still dominant in Bosnia. Historical interpretations of the 
recent conflicts are largely contested by ruling elites, ethnicities, and religions that are reluctant 
to leave selective views behind. Many Bosnian Serbs, backed by a few prominent bishops of the 
Serbian Orthodox Church and Serbian politicians, are still in denial that crimes committed 
against the Bošnjak (Muslim) population in Srebrenica were an act of genocide. In addition to 
continuous threats by the Republika Srpska to declare independence, an ongoing political crisis 
is always just a few steps from a serious relapse into new armed conflict.  
Finally, Croatia and Serbia, as former conflicting parties, are trapped in complex 
historical ethnic relations and interpretations. While Serbia fails to comply with the clear fact 
that aggression was orchestrated from Belgrade and officially recognize (and mark) the existence 
of detention camps on Serbian soil during the war, Croatia, with it’s closely intertwined relations 
between the Roman Catholic Church and the government, is sliding into the dangerous political 
romanticism of the Second World War, as Nazi collaborators are perceived as liberators and 
forerunners of Croatian independence. The city of Vukovar, the hallmark of the Croatian 
resistance to Serbian aggression, a besieged city that suffered the most during the war, depicts all 
the ambiguity, complexity, and absurdity of Serb-Croatian relations. Two decades after the war, 
local society is still very deeply segregated, forcing children of two ethnicities to attend school in 
different shifts, Serbs in the morning and Croats in the afternoon. 
Institutionalized and Collective Memory as the Source of Divisions 
Two decades after the war, the countries of the former Yugoslavia are still functioning as 
societies of “frozen conflicts,” full of religious and nationalist narratives about the threats of 
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‘others.’ Rather than as a reconciliatory memory or shared narrative, the past is often used trans-
generationally to instill hatred against a constructed enemy. Past conflicts thus become ‘frozen,’ 
paralyzing the present, and making the future very uncertain. The unhealed collective trauma of 
war is thus transmitted and perpetuated to future generations, evoking intolerance, and the 
repetition of violence, exclusivism, and radical nationalism. 
The conflicts in the former Yugoslavia were essentially of a political nature, yet they had 
a strong religious subtext where religions played a significant role in the creation of ethnic 
divisions and manipulation of memory, in the sense of raising religious and national awareness, 
and therefore served as conflict catalyst. Possibly, one of the pivotal common denominators is 
trans-generational remembrance articulated by the political and religious elites. Antagonism 
between the dominant religions in the Balkans is not rooted in dogmatic or theological 
differences, but rather in the religious imagination of the political, politicized religion and theo-
political articulation of trans-generational remembrance, consequently being transformed into a 
public narrative and social memory, sometimes deeply antagonized by religious or political  
factors. Therefore, dominant religions, instead of being the institutions of “collective memory,”1 
are playing the role of medium, or even "guardians" of (collective) trans-generational 
remembrance, lately referred to also as "postmemory"2 (Hirsch, 2012). Such narrative or role-
playing, after being politically manipulated into a "friend-foe" matrix, has strong conflict 
capacity by forming "post-believers" who view the "other" through the specific post-conflict 
construction of remembrance, which is sustaining ethnic tensions, religious extremism, and 
                                                           
1 Johann Baptist Metz .  Memoria Passionis, (Zagreb: Kršćanska Sadašnjost, 2009).  
2 Marianne Hirsch. The Generation of Postmemory: Writing and Visual Culture After the Holocaust, (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2012). 
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intolerance. Consequently, contemporary politics is "encompassed by religious imagination," 
while "social and political struggles have been drawn into the realm of cosmic drama."3 
Another very important issue is the institutional memory dominant in the Western 
Balkans states. It is the kind of remembrance that is rather selective, ideologically biased and 
exclusive, focusing on institutional forgetting of the facts. Consequently, the western Balkan 
governments are stressing the particular dates that stand as symbols of victory for independence 
against aggressors, while the critical dimension of such memory remains out of focus, or fully 
neglected by the political or religious elites. This is closely related to institutional identity 
divisions that occur “when the states label people according to ethnic, religious, or other 
objective criteria, and then apportion benefits based upon these labels.”4  
Examples of such institutional memory framing are "Victory and Homeland 
Thanksgiving Day and the Day of Croatian Defenders," celebrated on August 5 as one of the 
most important governmental events. While this event represents a hallmark of victory for 
Croats, the same is seen as the day of mourning for Serbs since the final outcome of the 
operation "Storm" was the expulsion of more than 200,000 Serbs from their homes. Another 
conflictual date is July 11. For Bosnian people, Srebrenica is the pivotal memory and climax of 
their suffering during the armed conflict; meanwhile, Serbs are commemorating the victims slain 
in Kravice by the Bosnian Army. While the Serbian Parliament adopted a declaration on March 
31, 2010 condemning the crime in Srebrenica, to this day, the government remains reluctant to 
declare July 11 as the day of remembrance. Over the past decades, major symbols of collective 
remembrance have emerged: "Bleiburg," as a symbol of the suffering of the "Croatian army" 
(Nazi collaborators who took part in the most horrific atrocities in World War II, during the rule 
                                                           
3 Mark Juergensmeyer,. “Religious Violence”, in Clarke, Peter, (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of the Sociology of 
Religion, (Oxford Handbooks Online, 2009), 891. 
4 Robert E. Hamilton, “Keep your eye on the Balkans”, https://www.fpri.org/article/2017/03/keep-eye-balkans/ 
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of the Independent State of Croatia) and the oppression of the communist regime, and Jasenovac, 
as a symbol of Serbian suffering and often used by the Milošević and satellite governments in 
Krajina and the Serbian Orthodox Church prior to and during the conflict to demonize the newly- 
elected government in Croatia and present them as a newly established and resurrected ustaša 
Independent State. 
These narratives are standing today as hallmarks of a collective memory of the western 
Balkans nations, which are reluctant to abandon such attitudes by empowering strong 
ethnopolitical narratives influencing public life, leaving divisions and thick "boundary lines" 
intact, keeping the Balkan peninsula trapped in the complex intertwining of ethnonationalism, 
religion, and politics. Such a political climate makes peace and stability almost unreachable, the 
future of the ex-Yugoslav states in murky waters, and the possibility of armed conflict not a very 
remote prospect.  
Not many scholars agree that a conflict renewal is a distant possibility, stating that the 
political crisis, identity divisions merged with economic distress, the increasing influence of 
Russia, and the clear fact that the western Balkans is one large unfinished reconciliation project. 
Colonel Robert Hamilton asserts that the West “should pay greater attention” to the 
western Balkans in order to “avoid the renewal of the conflict,” especially in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina where the “post-Dayton constitution institutionalizes identity divisions among 
Bosnia-Herzegovina’s people, in much the same way that the Yugoslav constitution did.” He 
further asserts that:  
the post-Dayton political structure—never meant to be a permanent fixture—has further 
divided and institutionalized three separate identities among the county’s citizens; this 
structure has provided ample fuel for a violent separatist conflict. The spark could come 
from a number of sources: contested elections, ethnic or religiously motivated violence, 
or an economic crisis are but three of several imaginable possibilities. Once a separatist 
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conflict begins, whether it escalates to all-out war depends in great part on the role played 
by external actors.5    
Timothy Less warns about possible consequences of losing the EU dominance over the Balkans: 
As the EU loses its dominance in the Balkans, so the region’s unresolved nationalisms 
are returning to the surface on a bed of popular discontent. The Balkans have the 
potential to blow their problems back into Europe, entangling the EU in a new, 
potentially violent regional crisis. This may not happen tomorrow but, as the EU’s 
influence wanes, the day of reckoning draws ever closer. “6 
With the collective memory constituting of deeply intertwined institutional nationalisms 
fostered by the ex-Yugoslav states—the kind of remembrance that is rather selective, 
ideologically biased, exclusive, and focusing on institutional forgetting of the facts—the political 
climate and peace prospects in the Western Balkans are very unlikely to change for  the better, 
but perhaps for the worse, emerging into a possible armed conflict that would lead already fragile 
EU at the brink of new humanitarian and political crisis.  
                                                           
5 Robert E. Hamilton, “Keep your eye on the Balkans”, https://www.fpri.org/article/2017/03/keep-eye-balkans/ 
6 Timothy Less, “The next Balkan wars”, https://www.newstatesman.com/world/2016/06/next-balkan-wars 
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